Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

Die Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) ist eine 2009 per Gesetz<ref> section 5 of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-21), signed into law by President Barack Obama on May 20, 2009</ref> gegründete Kommission, die von der US-Regierung bestellt wurde, um die Ursachen der Finanzkrise ab 2007 bis 2010 zu ermitteln. Die Kommission, die sich im Februar 2011 aufgelöst hat, bestand aus 10 Mitgliedern, ihr Vorsitzender war Phil Angelides (daher auch Angelides-Kommission). Eine ähnliche Institution gab es auch nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise mit der Pecora Commission. Im Unterschied zu dieser hatte die FCIC die Möglichkeit Zeugen vorzuladen und Beweismittel zu erzwingen.

Zusammensetzung

Die Sprecherin des Repräsentantenhauses Nancy Pelosi aus Kalifornien und der Mehrheitsführer im Senat Harry Reid aus Nevada (beide Demokraten) nominierten auf der Rechtsgrundlage der Section 5 des Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act von 2009 jeweils drei Mitglieder, der Minderheitsführer im Repräsentantenhaus John Boehner aus Ohio und der Minderheitsführer im Senat Mitch McConnell aus Kentucky (beide Republikaner) jeweils zwei Mitglieder:

• Phil Angelides (Vorsitzender) – gemeinsam als Vorsitzender ausgewählt von Pelosi und Reid
• Bill Thomas (stellvertretender Vorsitzender) – gemeinsam als stellvertretender Vorsitzender ausgewählt von Reid Boehner und McConnell
• Brooksley Born (Pelosi)
• Byron Georgiou (Reid)
• Bob Graham (Reid)
• Keith Hennessey (McConnell)
• Douglas Holtz-Eakin (McConnell)
• Heather Murren (Reid)
• John W. Thompson (Pelosi)
• Peter J. Wallison (Boehner)

Anhörungen

Die erste öffentliche Anhörung fand am 13. Januar 2010 statt. Während des Jahres 2010 wurden in mehr als 19 öffentlichen Anhörungen und 700 Vernehmungen zahlreiche Ökonomen, Bankmanager, Mitarbeiter von Regulierungsbehörden und andere Funktionsträger aus dem Bankensektor verhört. Unter den Befragten waren Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin und mehrere CEOs insolventer Wall-Street-Unternehmen.

Ergebnisbericht

Januar 2011 veröffentlichte die Kommission ihre Ergebnisse. In einer „einfachen Zusammenfassung“ unterscheidet sie zwischen dem Schadenspotential, das sich über Jahre erschaffen worden sei und dem Platzen der Immobilienblase:

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Während die Mehrheit der Kommissionsmitglieder die laxe Regulierung und mangelnde Aufsicht über das Bankenwesen verantwortlich machen, kommen die vier von den Republikanern ernannten Mitglieder zu Minderheitsvoten. Nach dem Minderheitsvotum von 3 Mitgliedern seien die globale Ungleichgewichte der wesentliche Grund gewesen. Nach dem Minderheitsvotum von einem Mitglied sei eine verfehlte Wohnungspolitik der Regierung verantwortlich.<ref>FAZ vom 2. Mai 2011, Wahnsinn am Abgrund.</ref>

Weblinks

• Offizielle Seite auf dem Internetauftritt der Universität Stanford (Law School)
• Report der FCIC

Einzelnachweise

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